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Does Hampton's argument that the provision of public/collective goods is not a prisoner's dilemma, but rather a multistage coordination problem make the problem of public good provision easier to solve for participants or harder to solve?

Hampton reformulates the free-rider problem's analysis as a PD into forms of coordination games (BoS, *etc.*). She performs this by transforming the modelling of public goods as a *step good* into an *incremental good*—in doing so she introduces the *producer selection problem*, and after its resolution a *critical cost point*. Ultimately her analysis makes the free-rider problem easier to solve *without a state*, which may or may not be suitable depending on the real-life situation.

Hampton shows certain mechanisms to select producers, *e.g.* by a political entrepreneur, who may “pay off for them individually [...] it might enhance their careers or increase their power.” She also shows the importance of cost-benefit estimates in incentivizing individual members to contribute. (In certain cases where the public good is incremental and costs uniquely assignable, the situation resembles a private good production, dissolving the PG problem.) During this selection how easy the problem is hinges on information provision and organization mechanisms (excluding state intervention) to select producers.

After producer selection, Hampton shows that even when the other player defects during production it may be beneficial to finish producing by oneself if one is past the *critical cost point*, where the benefits outweigh the costs in finishing production. Once production is undergoing the situation is modelled by a chicken game, where each is attempting to be the free-rider while attempting to prevent the other from renegeing. Ultimately if production is undergoing a coordination game is much easier to manage than a PD in incentivizing continuation.

(250 words)